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The study of criminal career paths is necessary to understand the methods of success 
employed by high-performing criminals. The aim of this article is to focus on the career 
path of Jack Herbert who set up and maintained extensive corruption networks between 
organised crime groups and police in the Australian state of Queensland. This study builds 
on Morselli’s work on the career paths of Sammy Gravano and Howard Marks that 
demonstrate how understanding social networks is an essential part of comprehending how 
organised criminals succeed. The data for this study were taken from the transcripts of the 
Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry, which uncovered the extensive and resilient corruption 
network operated by Herbert. Herbert’s relationships have been plotted to establish the 
nature of his operations. The findings indicate that communication of trust both allows for 
success and sets the boundaries of a network. Most 
importantly, this case study identifies Herbert’s reliance on holding a monopoly as the 
cornerstone of his network power and position. This article adds to the literature on 
criminal career paths by moving away from a classic organised criminal grouping into the 
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Career Path of a Corruption Entrepreneur 
 
The study of criminal career paths is necessary to understand the methods of success employed 
by high performing criminals. The aim of this paper is to focus this work on the career path of 
Jack Herbert who set up and maintained extensive corruption networks between organized crime 
groups and police in the Australian state of Queensland. This study builds on Morselli’s work on 
the career paths of Sammy Gravano and Howard Marks which demonstrate how understanding 
social networks is an essential part of comprehending how organized criminals succeed. The data 
for the current study was taken from the transcripts of the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry 
which uncovered the extensive and resilient corruption network operated by Herbert. Herbert’s 
relationships have been plotted to establish the nature of his operations. The findings indicate that 
communication of trust both allows for success and sets the boundaries of a network. Most 
importantly, this case study identifies Herbert’s reliance on holding a monopoly as the 
cornerstone of his network power and position. This article adds to the literature on criminal 
career paths by moving away from a classic organized criminal grouping into the area of police 
corruption, and uncovers the distinctive opportunities that this position offers the career criminal.  
 
 Keywords: criminal career path; police corruption; brokerage; reputation; trust; social networks 
 
 
Policing agencies try to target the leaders of criminal networks. At present there is no theory to 
support the identification of future leaders of these networks but one may be able to be 
developed by studying the careers of successful criminal entrepreneurs. It is important to 
understand how they entered their career path and how they rose to the top, to try and see if there 
are patterns in behavior or personality characteristics of the criminal high achievers that may be 
indicators of potential future leaders. Social network analysis tools can assist in this project by 
plotting the various positions within criminal networks of the criminal entrepreneur at the 
different stages of his/her career.  
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Criminologists are using social network analysis at an increasing rate, especially in 
relation to organized crime networks.1 Some of these studies address career and specific 
organized crime groups,2 while others approach the issue from the perspective of life course 
criminality.3 A key aspect of this research has been the role of brokers, the entrepreneurs of the 
illicit economy who bridge the gaps between different networks.4 However, this research has 
only progressed so far. In 2005, Burt opined that “We know brokerage creates an advantage, but 
we know little about how people come to be brokers.”5  
 
There has been limited research on criminal careers from a social network perspective 
and similarly few studies that have also focused specifically on the role of brokers. There are 
only two studies that take this approach6 into the careers of Howard Marks and Sammy Gravano.   
 
Morselli’s research tracked the careers of Howard ‘Mr Nice’ Marks, an international 
cannabis smuggler, and Sammy ‘The Bull’ Gravano, a member of the Cosa Nostra, through 
Burt’s theoretical lens. In accordance with Burt’s theory, Morselli’s studies showed that Marks’ 
                                                          
1 Carlo Morselli, Inside Criminal Networks, ed. Frank Bovenkerk, Studies of Organized Crime (New York: 
Springer, 2009); Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," in Networks and Netwars, ed. J Arquilla and D 
Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001 ); United Nations, "Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized 
Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries," (New York: United Nations, Office of Drugs and Crime, 2002); Pierre 
Tremblay, Martin Bouchard, and Sévrine Petit, "The Size and Influence of a Criminal Organization: A Criminal 
Achievement Perspective," Global Crime 10, no. 1 (2009); Mangai Natarajan, "Understanding the Structure of a 
Large Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data," Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology 22(2006). 
2 Patricia Adler and Peter Adler, "Shifts and Oscillations in Deviant Careers: The Case of Upper-Level Drug Dealers 
and Smugglers," Social Problems 31, no. 2 (1983); Francis Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in 
Organized Crime (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972); Natarajan, "Understanding the Structure of a Large 
Heroin Distribution Network: A Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data."; Mangai Natarajan and Mathieu 
Belanger, "Varieties of Drug Trafficking Organizations: A Typology of Cases Prosecuted in New York City," 
Journal of Drug Issues 28, no. 4 (1998). 
3 M. Vere van Koppen, Christianne J. de Poot, and Arjan A. J. Blokland, "Comparing Criminal Careers of 
Organized Crime Offenders and General Offenders," European Journal of Criminology 7, no. 5 (2010); M. Vere van 
Koppen et al., "Criminal Trajectories in Organized Crime," British Journal of Criminology (2009). 
4 Carlo Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis 
Trade," Crime, Law and Social Change 35, no. 3 (2001); Nigel Coles, "It's Not What You Know--It's Who You 
Know That Counts," The British Journal of Criminology 41, no. 4 (2001); S. Kaza, Hu Daning, and Chen Hsinchun, 
"Dynamic Social Network Analysis of a Dark Network: Identifying Significant Facilitators" (paper presented at the 
Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2007 IEEE, 2007). 
5 Ronald  Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 28; Carlo Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra," Crime, Law & 
Social Change 39, no. 4 (2003). 
6 Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade."; 
Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra." 
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and Gravano’s entrepreneurial successes were driven by reputation and trust, as well as a knack 
for brokering non-redundant relationships within and between illicit networks. These findings 
were dissimilar from most previous studies on criminal networks, which identified instrumental 
violence as a key component of managing and brokering illicit trade. Instead, in Morselli’s 
research, violence was merely a privilege to be enjoyed by those who build a good reputation 
and are successful brokers;7 it was predominantly an outcome of rather than a means to success.    
.  
Morselli’s research represents a significant advance in the study of criminal networks, 
particularly the role of the broker, from the perspective of social network theory. However, the 
research focused on the illicit drug trade and the Cosa Nostra. It is unclear whether the findings 
of these two studies are transferrable to illicit networks that operate within different contexts. To 
date, no studies have tracked the criminal career of an individual working within a legitimate 
policing agency.    
 
This article discusses the career of a corrupt police officer, Jack Herbert; the ‘bagman’ 
for the police corruption network uncovered by the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry in the late 
1980s in Queensland, Australia.8 This research represents a significant departure from earlier 
studies. As opposed to the contexts within which Marks and Gravano operated, corrupt police 
officers operate within a structured environment and are fixed by geography and administrative 
power. Working within this system provides distinct opportunities. This study focuses upon 
Herbert's ability to broker between different groups and build his reputation to attract clientele, 
which helped him succeed as a corruption entrepreneur. Thus, this research contributes to the 
bank of knowledge about how people come to be brokers in illicit business, but offers a fresh 
perspective based on a different context than previous studies. 
 
The sources for this research are statements made by Herbert both as a witness to the 
Commission of Inquiry and in his autobiography.9 This evidence forms the basis for a detailed 
analysis of specific events in Herbert’s criminal career path. The qualitative approach adopted in 
                                                          
7 Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra," 413. 
8 G E Fitzgerald, "Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council," (Brisbane: Queensland 
Parliament, 1989). 
9 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," (Brisbane: Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, 
1989); Jack Herbert and T Gilling, The Bagman (Sydney: ABC Books, 2004). 
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this study means that further research must be undertaken before any generalizations about the 
criminal careers of corrupt police officers (and/or criminal careers more generally) can be made. 
However, it is a necessary approach to garner richer material and more concrete answers about 
how a criminal has, in reality, actually succeeded.   
 
Building a Criminal Career 
Based on his studies of Marks and Gravano, Morselli demonstrated that there are two key 
avenues to success in a criminal network: reputation and brokerage. A good reputation will 
attract trust and smooth the creation of connections and cooperation within a group. 
Embeddedness in a criminal network is a source of social capital which provides access to 
information, goods and services.10 Thus the social network governs the actions of network 
members. But positioning oneself as a broker will accelerate advancement and open new 
opportunities that are not available to those who passively hold a good reputation.  
 
Reputation 
Wide-ranging networks tend to be made up of a heterogeneous collection of small groups of 
homogenous members. The small homogenous groups are closed networks, made up of people 
with strong relationships who share the same interest and the same information.11 The interaction 
of the members of the closed network allows its members to share information about the 
reputation of other members. A member’s reputation is determined by group members’ 
expectations of the person’s future performance based on his or her past performance within the 
group; repeated good performance builds an expectation of future good performance. A good 
reputation is built by emulating behavior that reflects the group’s norms; norms which are built 
up over the social history of the group. If a member of the group does not know a potential 
working partner they can obtain a reliable assessment of the person's trustworthiness, work ethic 
and commitment to the group’s shared values, by seeking the opinions of other group 
                                                          
10 B. McCarthy and J. Hagan, "Getting into Street Crime: The Structure and Process of Criminal Embeddedness," 
Social Science Research 24, no. 1 (1995); Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and 
Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade," 204. 
11 Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital, 12. 
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members.12 Thus gossip within a network allows a person to obtain a sufficient assessment of 
another group member’s reputation to decide whether they are trustworthy. 
 
Trust is reliant on having a good reputation. Without trust group members cannot work 
cooperatively for mutual gain. According to Burt, "You trust someone when you commit to a 
relationship before you know how the other person will behave."13 Being trustworthy is 
especially important to underworld operators. Criminals need to avoid conflict with their illicit 
partners because they do not have recourse to the mainstream legal system to enforce contracts 
or otherwise seek legal arbitration. As Haller noted, “Reliability as a partner (or, at least, the 
appearance of reliability) is important for career success.”14 Players have an incentive to keep “a 
good thing going”,15 namely money, productive relationships and trustworthiness just like in a 
legal network, and this requires a good reputation. Reuter and Haaga found that being “‘a good 
businessman’ was the term of praise, occasionally contrasted with excessively flamboyant and 
unstable characters, heavy users, and addicts, who would lose track of their accounts, miss 
appointments, and dip into their inventories.”16 Thus trust, as communicated by a good 
reputation, is a desirable component of a successful illicit career.  
 
A lack of trust can be a barrier to entry to an illicit network. Adler and Adler found that 
low level dealers had trouble moving into upper levels because they were not known and trusted 
by those working at those levels.17 Middle level operators entered the market through “the 
establishment of relationships with local dealers and smugglers... a self-selecting sample of 
outsiders who become accepted and trusted by these upper-level traffickers, based on their 
mutual interests, orientation, and values”.18 Thus in the secretive world of illicit networks, 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 11; cf. Klaus von Lampe, "Organized Crime and Trust: On the Conceptualization and Empirical Relevance 
of Trust in the Context of Criminal Networks," Global Crime 6, no. 2 (2004). 
13 Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital, 93. 
14 Mark Haller, "Illegal Enterprise: A Theoretical and Historical Interpretation," Criminology 28(1990): 222. 
15 Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade," 
208. 
16 Peter Reuter and John Haaga, The Organization of High-Level Drug Markets: An Exploratory Study (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1989), 36. 
17 Adler and Adler, "Shifts and Oscillations in Deviant Careers: The Case of Upper-Level Drug Dealers and 
Smugglers," 198. 
18 Ibid., 198. 
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operators need trust in their partners to avoid conflict and they rely on reputational information 
to determine who is trustworthy.  
 
Morselli’s research showed that these characteristics were both key to the successful 
careers of Marks and Gravano. Marks’ success came from being a peripheral player, which gave 
him a low profile and allowed him to keep a trustworthy reputation by setting out fair rules of 
engagement that required all players to share the burden and compensate each other for losses. 
Alternatively, Gravano built his career by building trusting relationships with good patrons and 
then exploiting the patrons’ networks. Thus, while reputation and trust were key in the initial 
stages of Gravano’s career, ironically, advancement occurred by exploiting this trust to bypass 
the patron.     
 
Brokerage 
Activity in networks depends on locations/relations of players within the networks more than the 
personalities of the members of the network.19 Groups may be connected by individuals who, for 
a variety of reasons, either by chance or design, form bridges between these groups; that is, they 
communicate and have relationships with members of more than one group. These brokers are in 
a position to pass information, arbiter disputes and negotiate cooperation between the groups.  
 
Brokerage is a desirable position in a network as it allows the broker to administer the 
information flow between groups as an ‘opinion leader’.20 The broker can restrict the flow of 
information to pursue his own advantage. For example, a broker in a police corruption network 
would link illicit operators with police, and channel the demand for protection from law 
enforcement and its supply from a covert group within the police.21 Very importantly in dark 
networks, the broker is able to communicate reputations.22 Dark network participants need to 
communicate covertly that they can be trusted to keep the secrets of the group and that they have 
                                                          
19 Ronald Burt, Strucutural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 4. 
20 Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital, 17. 
21 Ibid., 61-62. 
22 Ibid., 94. 
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the necessary skills the groups needs.23 But there is more to being a successful broker than 
simply filling a gap. A broker should not waste time by investing in redundant ties; he/she only 
needs one ‘node’ in each network. Two nodes in the same network means that one is redundant 
as it can only provide the same information and access as the other node. It is more efficient to 
only invest in one connection and invest time in connections with new groups.24 This concept is 
also known as network constraint; the higher one’s network constraint the lower the efficiency of 
one’s network connections. Morselli hypothesizes that network constraint changes over a 
person’s career. At a low position a person will have high network constraint because they are 
part of a closed network and do not know anyone that their colleagues do not know. For 
example, a gang member knows the other gang members, but so do all the gang members, thus 
they do not have exclusive knowledge that they can broker to others. Instead, successful 
criminals create new relationships that exploit niches of opportunity and increase their power.25  
 
Mafia networks have a pecking order which operates as patron-client relationships.26 Y 
makes his career via X who introduces him to a patron and dependents. As Morselli explains, 
“The sponsor (the patron) is essentially brokering between ego [the striving entrepreneur] and 
others (the clients) and is therefore competitively advantaged in his position.”27 Morselli calls 
this an influence structure and thinks of it as a type of brokerage.28 An ambitious criminal finds 
patrons who are also brokers, who can offer both instruction and new connections; “This is their 
entrepreneurial character”.29 The ambitious criminal then needs to bypass their patron to forge 
their own links with the patron’s connections thus grabbing their own low network constrained 
career and being more able to adapt to a crisis.30  
 
                                                          
23 Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009). 
24 Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade," 
205. 
25 Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra."; Adler and Adler, "Shifts and 
Oscillations in Deviant Careers: The Case of Upper-Level Drug Dealers and Smugglers," 199. 
26 Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra," 384; Ianni, A Family 
Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime. 
27 Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra," 388. 
28 Ibid., 386. 
29 Ibid., 387. 
30 Ibid., 388. 
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Morselli found that when Gravano had succeeded in advancing his career he had the 
luxury of being able to decrease his network constraint and achieve network closure.31 Gravano 
was able to do this because he had a competitive advantage in controlling violence,32 and made 
himself indispensible to his criminal network.33 “Closing one’s network is a privilege and allows 
the criminal entrepreneur to remain selective in choosing opportunities.”34 Network closure 
reduces exposure to policing, as well as increased autonomy and time. Access to decision 
making allows you to ‘trim your network’.35 Ironically, the patron client relationship would 
develop through reputation and trust, but advancement occurs through exploiting this trust to 
bypass the patron.  
 
Another side of the criminal success track is to find trustworthy and skillful co-offenders. 
One must search for suitable co-offenders and build strong ties with them to reduce the chance of 
betrayal and failure, while at the same time finding new weak ties to increase criminal 
opportunities.36 New opportunities come from the unknown rather than the familiar; people in 
strong relationships share their knowledge thus they are not sources of new information without 
an external source. Thus one must find opportunities amongst acquaintances and friends of 
friends; weak ties.37  
 
  Morselli found that the primary means of Marks’ success was proactively seeking and 
exploiting opportunities for brokerage.38 Unlike Gravano, Marks did not exploit patronage to 
succeed, rather he positioned himself as a reliable specialist in a loose network of entrepreneurs. 
Nonetheless, he actively pursued his opportunities to advance his career. Thus it can be 
hypothesized that the passive criminal will be less successful in this regard.  
 
Police corruption networks 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 399-400. 
32 Ibid., 406. 
33 Ibid., 407. 
34 Ibid., 400. 
35 Ibid., 412. 
36 P. Tremblay, "Searching for Suitable Co-Offenders," in Routine Activity and Rational Choice: Advances in 
Criminological Theory, ed. R V Clarke and Marcus Felson (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993). 
37 Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973). 
38 Morselli, "Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade," 
220. 
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According to the literature, a good reputation built on trust and the ability to broker networks are 
the two key characteristics of a successful criminal. Morselli identified both of these 
characteristics in his studies of Marks’ and Gravano’s criminal careers.  However, there are 
distinct differences between the contexts within which Marks, Gravano and Jack Herbert 
operated. 
 
Organized crime operates through social networks that include both underworld and 
upper-world actors.39 Corrupt police are upper-world actors interacting with the underworld and 
police corruption operates on the basis of protection,40 which arises when the state is weak and 
cannot provide protection for its citizens. In addition, state protection does not extend to some 
sections of the community, such as ethnic minorities who do not trust the state, or the protection 
for illegal activity. The purveyors of such activity cannot look to the state apparatus to protect 
them from violence or to enforce their contracts. In such a case the operators need a hegemon to 
bring stability to the market. Like any illicit hegemony, the police can create their own market 
for protection.41 Thus corrupt police differ from other organized crime groups because they 
operate within a legitimate organization, even though they are providing an illegitimate service. 
It would be reasonable to assume that the structure of the police organization directly affects the 
career path of a corrupt police officer. But Lauchs et al have established that, at least in relation 
to ‘the Joke’ network, where Queensland Licensing Branch (QLB) officers collected money 
from Starting Price (SP) bookmakers in return for protection, there was no relationship between 
agency hierarchy and authority within the corruption network.42   
 
According to Reuter and Haaga43 capital of a criminal enterprise consists of the inventory 
in hand, because of the fast turn-over of transactions, and the goodwill of the entrepreneur. In 
their study of the drug trafficking industry they said that resilience was not necessary. These 
                                                          
39 Jeffrey S McIllwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," Crime, Law and Social Change 32, no. 4 
(1999); Alan Block, East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York City 1930-1950, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: 
Transaction, 1994); Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant 
Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
40 Stergios Skaperdas, "The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does 
Not," Economics of Governance 2, no. 3 (2001).  
41 Ibid., 179. 
42 Mark Lauchs, Robyn Keast, and Nina Yousepfour, "Corrupt Police Networks: Uncovering Hidden Relationship 
Patterns, Functions and Roles," Policing and Society 21, no. 1 (2011). 
43 Reuter and Haaga, The Organization of High-Level Drug Markets: An Exploratory Study. 
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findings do not apply to police. They have a monopoly over policing powers with no competition 
other than that provided by other police. This monopoly is permanent even though the 
individuals involved change over time. Also, the police are geographically bound, that is, they 
cannot extend their power beyond their operational jurisdiction. Thus, while criminals are 
flexible, ephemeral and mobile, police are fixed in a hierarchy, resilient and restrained to a 
locale.  
 
Immobility caused by the geographic boundaries of police operations has the potential to 
make corrupt police more vulnerable to detection. Ironically, the corrupt police purveying 
protection are, in turn, potential customers for protection from investigation by other police. The 
scene is then set with three sets of players: the illicit operators seeking protection, the vice police 
who can provide that protection, and the senior police who can protect the corrupt police. Thus 
there are multiple opportunities for brokerage.  
 
Given the differences between the contexts of Morselli’s studies and the context of this 
study, it is unclear whether Morselli’s findings are transferrable. This study seeks to contribute to 
the knowledge in this field by determining whether these characteristics are also apparent in the 
criminal career of a corrupt police officer. If the characteristics are transferrable, it can be 
assumed that there will be evidence that Herbert’s success within the police corruption network 
relied on a good reputation and a high level of trust from other network members, as well as the 
active pursuit of opportunities for brokerage between illicit networks.  
 
Method 
This paper follows the basic structure used by Morselli in his studies of Gravano and Marks. The 
sources of information used here included Herbert’s 1000 pages of evidence before the 
Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry and his autobiography.44 These were studied to identify every 
person to which Herbert was linked in his various corruption networks. These links were then 
plotted as ego networks (that is, a network of the relationships of a specific individual, in this 
case Herbert) using Analyst Notebook 8.9.  
                                                          
44 Names of associates are used in the charts. These were all provided in open testimony during the Inquiry and 
reported in the local media. No names were suppressed. Thus there are no issues of defamation arising from their 
usage here. 
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Morselli was able to list connections chronologically. Unfortunately, for this study the 
majority of information was gleaned from the Commission’s hearing transcripts where 
questioning jumps from topic to topic in a non-chronological manner. Relationships were mostly 
discussed as blocks of connections rather than as a history of how Herbert met his network 
compatriots. Consequently it is not possible to provide a chronological history of introductions 
and network connections, rather the network maps encompass all connections within a specific 
network for the network’s life. Also, Herbert does not provide enough information to determine 
the strength of relationships with any rigor. However, all relationships in the charts are recurring 
payments. One-off payments were rare and have not been included. Thus from an illicit business 
perspective all links represent strong ties.  
 
Morselli provided ‘cumulative working networks’ for both of his subjects.45 However, 
for this project a judgment call was made to discuss the networks separately. This better reflects 
the way in which Herbert approached them, for example, while some individuals participate in 
multiple networks, each network had a separate rate of payment and dispersed the corrupt funds 
to different groups of police officers (notwithstanding the continued role of the QLB in each 
network).  
 
The final analysis of the networks is based on the evidence given by Herbert in his 
testimony and autobiography. Inferences are made based on the nature of the networks and 
actions of other members. The author looked for evidence of:  
• trust and reputation namely, connections being made specifically based on word of mouth 
communication of Herbert’s reputation including decisions by group members to rely on 
Herbert based on their knowledge of his reputation and/or occasions where weak contacts 
used information from closer tied contacts to gauge Herbert’s reputation.  
• situations in which the network was not extended because Herbert could not establish 
sufficient evidence to trust a potential new member.  
• Herbert exploiting monopolistic power to broker relationships and succeed.  
                                                          
45 Morselli, "Career Opportunities and Network-Based Privileges in the Cosa Nostra."; Morselli, "Structuring Mr. 
Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade." 
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The evidence relied upon in this study was disputed but not definitively refuted in the 
public record. Therefore the data used here is similar to that derived through offender interviews; 
essentially the subjective account of events from Herbert’s perspective.  Not only is this the most 
accurate data available but Herbert was cross-examined on key points during the Inquiry by 
lawyers for various parties he named in evidence.46 
 
Herbert’s Career 
Herbert's career and corruption went through multiple phases, though he continued to work 
within the same network of contacts. Phase 1 was the ‘first Joke’ which operated protection for 
illegal bookmakers by the QLB. This had two sub phases, his apprenticeship and his role as 
bagman. During the first phase (between 1977 and 1981) Herbert was employed in the gaming 
industry. The second phase began at the latter end of the first phase and continued until the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry began in 1987. During this second phase, Herbert was involved in three 
separate networks; illegal bookmakers gaming and prostitution in Brisbane and gaming and 
prostitution on the Gold Coast. 
 
The First Joke 
Herbert had not been associated with corruption in his early career.47 He had seen SP 
bookmaking and afterhours drinking in his first posting to the town of Mackay but was not aware 
of payments being made for protection.48 When he entered the QLB he could see that younger 
men were in better financial positions than he was and assumed that there was ‘a quid around’; 
that bribes were being taken.49 Two operations were afoot. One was run by an individual, 
Sergeant Falcongreen, who was protecting two bookmakers. The other was a more sophisticated 
system that had been in operation for many years, called the Joke. Under this system, QLB 
officers collected money from SP bookmakers in return for protection.50  
 
                                                          
46 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings." 
47 Herbert and Gilling, The Bagman, 49. 
48 Ibid., 40-41. 
49 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15287-88. 
50 Ibid., 15289. 
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Herbert was not invited to join the Joke, as he did not have the social capital in the form 
of strong ties needed for the group members to trust him. So he resorted to extortion. He told 
everyone that he would be following an unnamed SP bookmaker with a view to arresting him. 
The Joke members were concerned that it was one of their bookmakers, so they introduced 
Herbert to the Joke and began paying him.51  
 
There were four broad groups in the corruption network (see Figure 1). First were the 
bookmakers, individuals or partnerships, paying into the Joke. Second were the QLB officers 
who collected bribes from networks of their own bookmakers. Being a collector (a broker 
between the Joke and bookmakers) was a powerful position as they could charge what they 
wished for the bribe as long as they handed over the required sum to other Joke members.52 
Third were the Organisers who collected money directly from their own network of bookmakers 
and from the other collectors. They then distributed payments to the forth group, the QLB 
officers in the Joke who did not have networks of bookmakers.  
 
Entry into the Joke was via a trust network. A police officer or bookmaker had to be 
approved by an informal committee of senior members based on their assessment of the person’s 
trustworthiness. Trust was obtained through testing or via references from trusted sources. 
Bookmakers were only taken if they had a reference from an existing Joke member, even if that 
was obtained indirectly from a reputation network. Police officers could join with a reference or 
via an ‘integrity’ test; they were exposed to a low level opportunity to take a small payment. 
Those who took the payment were introduced to the Joke. The trust extended to a person’s 
willingness to pay or take a bribe and maintain secrecy. Ironically, there was also a great deal of 
mistrust amongst members, especially driven by concerns that brokers were taking more than 
their share.53  
 
Once in the Joke, Herbert built his social capital within the group to obtain a position that 
allowed him to commence monopolizing the social capital of brokerage. Herbert had a knack for 
detailed analysis and established a reputation as a thorough and rigorous operator; someone who 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 15289-90. 
52 Ibid., 15315-17. 
53 Ibid., 15315-17. 
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was “rather fussy”.54 Herbert soon learned the role of organizer from the incumbent, Johnson. 
When Johnson left the QLB, Herbert took over the role of organizer and changed the system.55 
Herbert obtained this position through his reputation, and used it to successively take over the 
role of each Collector that left the QLB. By doing so he increased his role as broker to the 
bookmakers and handled a much larger portion of the money than his predecessor. The number 
of bookmakers participating in the Joke also increased. In the early 1960s, twenty-four 
bookmakers paid money via thirteen QLB officers. But by 1974, eight bookmakers paid through 
four officers and the remaining forty-four bookmakers paid direct to Herbert or via another 
bookmaker (see Figure 2).56 Johnson had direct contact with five bookmakers while Herbert had 
direct contact with 33 bookmakers. He also had no plans for a protégé to learn his role.57 It 
appears therefore, that Herbert intended to monopolize the position and its power.  
 
No specific reason for this increase in participation is given in the transcript but it can be 
inferred that reputation was a key factor. Given that all new bookmakers were introduced by an 
existing bookmaker or a police officer, the increased rate of participation can be interpreted as a 
sign that they saw the Joke as a reliable method of protecting their operation. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the bookmakers came from the same geographic areas (the inner city and the 
Southern suburbs). Non-Joke member bookmakers were still being arrested by the QLB so there 
were plenty of potential customers who did not join and were not approached. Their exclusion 
can be put down to trust – bookmakers did not know or trust the QLB officers to take bribes and 
the QLB officers (Herbert made all decisions in concert with the other longest serving members 
of the Joke) did not trust a bookmaker they did not know. Thus both sides needed a reputational 
reference from a trusted associate before they would join and the bookmakers in the northern 
suburbs lacked a broker. Herbert’s reputation was sufficiently sound to attract more bookmakers 
to the Joke.  
 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 15295. 
55 Ibid., 15295. 
56 Ibid., 15298-316. 
57 Money was paid to other officers in the QLB. It is clear from Herbert's evidence that other forms of protection 
were also taking place in the QLB. Some nightclubs were being informed of raids, as were brothels but, according to 
Herbert, he was not involved. 
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Herbert obtained success through his reputation and trustworthiness but he refused to 
trust other police with his role. The cost of this success was high network constraint. He had 
thirty-three bookmakers and four QLB officers to meet on the first of every month. Most were on 
the south side of the city but even at just twenty minutes per meeting this would take over eleven 
hours to make collections. On top of this he needed to distribute payments to over fifteen 
officers. He also managed the distribution and maintenance of a list of phone numbers to warn of 
raids as well as the allocation of the duty roster to make certain that a Joke member was in every 
car on race days.58 However, Herbert’s network was still efficient in the sense that he used 
intermediaries when they were available, though most bookmakers did not operate in networks. 
Herbert had to deal with them individually and did not have the ability to choose a single point of 
contact for a larger network of bookmakers. As we will see, he later partly resolves this issue via 
delegation. But at this stage of his career he could not delegate without making himself 
redundant; a subordinate Organiser could compete for his brokerage position. Beyond his 
reputation, Herbert had nothing to secure his ownership of the position. 
 
Herbert’s reputation for efficiency, silence and reliability for making payments kept him 
in the position as Organiser in the network and also brought in new players. While Herbert 
moved up a rank in the Queensland Police during the period of the first Joke, it had no effect on 
his role in the corruption network. There were also more senior officers in the Joke who had less 
responsibility and rank and yet played no operational role in the ongoing activity of the 
corruption network.59  
 
Gaming machine phase  
Herbert left the police in 1974 because of changing arrangements under a new Police 
Commissioner which increased scrutiny of Joke members.60 Herbert claimed that the Joke ended 
with his departure as all the Joke members who were senior police in the QLB had also left.61  
 
                                                          
58 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15296. 
60 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15318. 
60 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15318. 
61 Ibid., 15365. 
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Once out of the police force, Herbert was approached by McIntyre, a bookmaker he knew 
from the Joke, about creating a new Joke with the incoming QLB Inspector, Pitts. The two met 
Pitts but were unaware they were being taped. Both were charged with corruption, but managed 
to get off on trial by falsely discrediting Pitts with the help of other police officers.62  
 
Tony Robinson was an operator of nightclubs and illegal games during the period that 
Herbert was in the QLB. Robinson was not paying into the Joke, although he was paying 
protection to two Joke members, Murphy and Lewis.63 In late 1977, Robinson approached 
Herbert and suggested that he should work for another gaming operator, Jack Rooklyn.64 
Rooklyn ran a company called Queensland Automatics (QA) which supplied ticket machines and 
Bally in-line machines to clubs. Robinson was at this stage also running a similar, but smaller 
company, Austral Amusements (AA). Both companies were knowingly involved in breaking the 
law as the machines’ popularity came from disguised gambling.65 The government was equally 
involved in the scam placing a $400-600 license fee on each machine compared with a few 
dollars for a pinball machine.66 Herbert became entrepreneurial in finding new ways to profit 
from corruption. He was no longer in  a position to sell a service, as he was a civilian, but he 
could play off his position in QA to broker with clients and his connections in government.  
 
The reality of the machines’ use made the suppliers vulnerable to extortion. AA was 
making monthly payments to Don Lane, a former policeman and then politician, with 
connections in the Department of Justice, and Leo McQuillan, the head of the Licensing 
Commission. The payments ensured that the Department did not close down the gaming 
business.67 Herbert became the bagman for the scheme; he delivered McQuillan’s payments to 
                                                          
62 Ibid., 15351-63. 
63 Ibid., 15320. 
64 Ibid., 15367. 
65 Ticket machines allowed a punter to put in 20c and receive a numbered ticket. Certain numbers won prizes. It was 
illegal for a proprietor to give cash equivalents for prizes but everybody did. This was so prevalent that ticket 
machines were known colloquially as Joh’s Pokies, after the Premier, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who refused to 
allow poker machines into Queensland. The companies supplied the ticket machines for free and serviced them at no 
cost. But they sold the $3 blocks of tickets to the clubs for $10 each. In-line machines were like a pinball machine 
but the player received a prize for aligning balls in patterns of holes on the gaming surface. There were no prizes but 
players won free games which they illicitly redeemed for cash with the management of the club. 
66 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15381-87. 
67 Ibid., 15371-72. 
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an intermediary and occasionally made deliveries to Lane.68 Herbert used this knowledge to 
extort money from the companies. He informed the former Joke member, Terry Lewis, who had 
recently been appointed Police Commissioner, about the payments to Lane and McQuillan. 
Lewis had power over policing the machines’ misuse under the Suppression of Gaming Act and 
was annoyed that he was not also receiving protection money. Herbert arranged for regular 
payments to be made from Rooklyn, Robinson and Harvey of $2000 per month of which he took 
a $500 cut. The money was given to Herbert by Rooklyn’s accountant, John Garde. These 
payments continued up until the start of the Inquiry in 1987.69 When rumors began about the 
legalization of poker machines, an initiative which would have killed the trade in ticket and 
inline machines, Herbert again initiated discussions which resulted in a $25,000 bribe from the 
companies to Lewis. Herbert had used his social capital in the form of his long standing 
relationship with Lewis. He had not intended to rebuild a corruption network but the opportunity 
arose of the coincidence of his reputation of trustworthiness with operators of illegal gambling 
and his link to the Police Commissioner.  
 
Herbert also became involved in other bribery scams. Clubs would only take one 
company’s gaming machines and competition was fierce. MacNamara had already told Herbert 
that he was bribing a committee member of the lucrative Cricketers Club to ensure that QA was 
retained as machine supplier.70 This gave Herbert confidence that corrupt opportunities still 
existed in the gaming industry. Herbert was also in an excellent brokerage position. He travelled 
around installing machines and talking to managers, so he could determine who could be trusted 
with bribes. At first he took a passive role. While Herbert was working for QA, Rooklyn began 
paying him $100 per week for information on clubs that were vulnerable to a takeover.71 Herbert 
then became proactive. He took a $1000 finder’s fee after informing MacNamara about a 
vulnerable football club manager.72 MacNamara and Herbert also joined together to arrange a 
QA takeover of the lucrative Kedron-Wavell Returned Servicemen’s Leagues club. They split an 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 15377-78. 
69 Ibid., 15392-99. 
70 Ibid., 15389. 
71 Ibid., 15396. 
72 Ibid., 15397. 
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undisclosed bribe with the manager and Garde. Herbert, MacNamara and Garde continued to 
share $700-900 per month from the manager right through to 1987.73 
 
Herbert was able to act as a broker between multiple groups (see Figure 3). By using his 
brokerage skills, he created significant opportunities and advantages for himself. Conversely his 
legitimate business connections brought him social capital which he used to identify corruption 
opportunities. Herbert’s pre-existing relationship with the Police Commissioner also positioned 
him to create a lucrative ongoing bribery opportunity. The value of his position is revealed by the 
inability of the networked constrained members of the businesses to create these opportunities 
for themselves. They recognized and participated, eagerly in all cases except the Lewis monthly 
payments.  
 
The Second Joke  
Following the successful gaming extortion, Herbert approached Lewis in 1980 about installing 
trustworthy senior officers into the QLB so that they could reestablish the Joke.74 He then began 
bringing together bookmakers that he had maintained relationships with since 1974.75 Some 
bookmakers brought groups of others with them. For example, McIntyre brought four 
bookmakers, Keenan brought six and White brought three (see Figure 4).  
 
There are two significant differences between this Joke and the previous Joke. First, 
Herbert was now outside of the police force and no longer distributed money to the police 
officers involved as he did during the first Joke. He made a single payment to the head of the 
QLB and left it to him to distribute money to the other officers. This was much more efficient 
and reduced his network constraint. Significantly, Herbert did not even know, and did not need 
to know, exactly who was receiving money within the QLB. The second major change was that 
Herbert delegated a large number of bookmakers to a former police officer, Yorke, who began 
making collections for Herbert. Yorke had connections to 16 bookmakers and was taking a cut of 
their payment. Herbert, on the other hand, was only directly connected to 13 bookmakers, 
                                                          
73 Ibid., 15420-22. 
74 The first attempt failed as Rigney was appointed Inspector and refused to participate. He only stayed for a few 
months and then Dwyer was appointed. Herbert visited him to tell him he had arranged for his appointment on the 
basis that they “could get a few things going in the Licensing Branch.” Ibid., 15465-66. 
75 Ibid., 15464. 
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although his indirect network of bookmakers was larger than that that ran through Yorke.76 As 
with the earlier Joke, the network was built on Herbert’s reputation. The bookmakers returned 
from the same connections and geographic area as the first Joke. In addition, new members were 
not approved without a recommendation from a trusted Joke member.  
 
Herbert was approached by the new head of the QLB and asked if he was interested in 
earning a “red shilling” – police parlance for bribes from prostitution. This was a relatively small 
network due to the hold on the market by two consortiums: Hector Hapeta and Anne-Marie 
Tilley ran one network and Victor Conte and Gerry Bellino ran the other.77 Both consortiums 
were involved in nightclubs, gaming and prostitution. Herbert did not create any of the 
connections; rather people came to Herbert and asked him to be a bagman. This was done for 
two reasons. First, Herbert was outside of the police force and could more easily meet with 
operators and collect money. Secondly, and very importantly, Herbert was the only connection 
the corrupt police had to the police Commissioner.   
 
A completely separate network for gaming and prostitution was set up on the Gold Coast, 
the tourist Mecca of Queensland. Many of the same players were involved in this network as the 
Brisbane network. For example, the Police Commissioner and the QLB in Brisbane were still 
paid, and Hapeta and Tilley were operating prostitution on the Gold Coast as well as in Brisbane, 
while Vic Conte was running a gaming operation on the Gold Coast. There were also new 
players in the Gold Coast in both gaming and prostitution who made payments via Herbert. In 
addition Herbert had to make payments to the Gold Coast CID police officers. However, the 
same rules applied. New members needed to be confirmed by trustworthy sources, usually ex-
police officers. Herbert did not proactively seek any of the arrangements; rather the operators or 
police approached him to adopt the role of Bagman.  
 
Herbert was also running two sideline operations: with junior officers in the QLB, 
Burgess and Trevor Ross, to extract additional payments from prostitution and sex shop 
operations; and with junior officers in the Gold Coast CID. The second operation introduces an 
                                                          
76 Herbert was also aware that some bookmakers were making separate payments to local Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) officers in their areas. 
77 Fitzgerald Inquiry, "Transcript of Proceedings," 15525-26. 
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interesting aspect of Herbert’s reputation. The Gold Coast officers knew that they could include 
Herbert and he would not tell the other Joke members about the payments. However, there was 
an expectation amongst Joke members that he would take every opportunity to keep money for 
himself at the expense of his colleagues. Bizarrely this distrust amongst members of the Joke was 
so widespread and understood that Burgess and Ross could ‘trust’ Herbert to act in an 
untrustworthy manner.  
 
Herbert’s monopoly on contact with the Police Commissioner gave him two significant 
advantages. First, Herbert advised the Commissioner on high ranking appointments to the QLB. 
These officers knew that their job was to make money on behalf of the Police Commissioner.78 
They also knew they had to make Herbert happy in order to make the Commissioner happy. If 
Herbert discovered that the officers were running a sideline operation he would threaten to tell 
the Commissioner if they did not include him in the payments.79 Second, the Commissioner’s 
protection was essential for reducing the likelihood of investigations into corruption. Lewis 
appears to have been sufficiently distrustful of his junior officers that he would only deal in these 
payments via Herbert. Thus Herbert had exclusive access to the Commissioner on questions of 
protection. This monopoly meant that he did not need to seek corruption opportunities. Officers 
brought them to him because they could not afford to have the Commissioner discover that he 
was missing out on a cut. 
 
The final network had 72 nodes excluding Herbert. He reduced his exposure to police 
officers from 24 in the first Joke to nine in the second. Similarly, he dropped from 33 direct links 
to bookmakers to a total of 22 links to illegal operators or their intermediaries. This is an overall 
drop of 57 links to 31. This is, however, still a very large number of links.  
 
Herbert’s reduction in network constraint appears to have been driven by opportunity 
cost. Herbert was making much more money from the illegal gaming and prostitution sources 
                                                          
78 Herbert said “there were quite a few conversations between myself and Dwyer that he had been put there to try 
and make a quid for terry and, naturally, myself” ibid., 15523. 
79 When Herbert discovered some police were protecting a bookmaker outside the Joke he told one of them that “he 
had gone outside the system and that if I told Terry Lewis [the Police Commissioner], that he would have been most 
upset about the whole deal. I mentioned this because I knew that the only hold I had, not being a policeman, on the 
Licensing Branch chaps was the fact that I knew the Commissioner.” Ibid., 15488. 
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than from bookmakers.80 Conversely, he was pooling all the money he received from 
bookmakers and only passing a set amount to the police and Commissioner. He openly admitted 
to keeping the rest for himself.81 Herbert also did not fear prosecution. His connection to the 
Commissioner ensured protection. Thus he could accept the higher risk of identification inherent 
in having high network constraint.  
 
Findings 
The Joke members from the QLB represented a closed network. Their members shared values 
about the nature of their illegal activity, the manner of distribution of bribes and the need to 
provide mutual support. Similar to Morselli’s findings, people entered the network through 
trusted connections and had to build their own reputation within the network. While Herbert 
overcame his original lack of reputation and trust by extorting the Joke participants, once in the 
group he built a good reputation. The networks could have been much larger but Herbert refused 
to proactively seek members or expose the network to the risk of unknown elements.  
 
Herbert’s reputation brought him success on several occasions: 
• He took over as organizer by establishing a record of good management and reliability. The 
same record gave him control over assignments which significantly assisted the corruption 
network. 
• He extended his network based on new entrants relying upon his good reputation. 
• He later obtained work in the gaming industry and was promoted based on his reputation for 
rigor and good management.  
• He re-established the Joke when bookmakers identified him as the only person with the 
operational knowledge and connections to bring it back into operation. 
• He became the bagman for the illegal gaming and prostitution networks in Brisbane and the 
Gold Coast partly based on his reputation for successfully running the Joke. 
 
Herbert also exploited his social capital for advancement by brokering relationships: 
                                                          
80 In 1985 the bookmakers were paying a total of $14,000 per month while Conte and Bellino paid $17,000 and 
Hapeta and Tilley $23,000. Ibid., 15800. 
81 Ibid., 15795-815. 
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• When he was inside the QLB he used his position to assume control of brokerage 
arrangements as collectors for the Joke gradually left the branch.  
• As the Organizer, he managed the network’s relationships and was well positioned to become 
the new contact for the bookmakers.  
• He formed and maintained a fortuitous relationship with Terry Lewis. This relationship was 
originally formed in the 1960’s before Lewis was made Police Commissioner through his 
own ministrations in 1976. While Herbert could not have known this would occur, he found 
himself in a position to exploit this relationship to their mutual benefit. Herbert combined his 
reputation as first point of call for organizing a Joke with his monopoly of contact with the 
Commissioner. This put him in a position to be passive in receiving corruption opportunities. 
He had been proactive in beginning the networks, including arranging the appointment of 
corruptible officers to key positions, and then used his brokerage position to compel the 
officers to use him as bagman for their operations.  
 
These findings are similar to those of Morselli’s studies. There were multiple occasions 
where Herbert relied upon the development of his reputation and trust between members of the 
network to succeed. Herbert was also a successful broker and established relationships with key 
players, arguably the most important being the Police Commissioner, to ensure that he remained 
indispensible to the corruption network.  
 
Despite the similarities, there are also some differences between Herbert’s career and the 
careers of Marks and Gravano. Gravano progressed by finding good patrons, exploiting their 
networks and securing a position of power from which he could reduce his network constraint. 
Herbert did not exploit a patron. In the first Joke he apprenticed himself to Johnson with the 
acquiescence of the group and then assumed Johnson’s position when he left the QLB. In the 
second Joke Herbert established a network and expanded it by holding a monopoly as the broker 
to the Police Commissioner. He was able to delegate collection from some of his bookmakers to 
Yorke and payment of the police to the head of the QLB. But he retained a high network 
constraint albeit lower than that of the first Joke. Furthermore, while Herbert’s career was similar 
to Marks’ in that they both relied heavily on their reputations for success, Herbert had a stronger 
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position as Marks lacked the coercive power and protection afforded by Herbert’s brokerage of 
communication with the Police Commissioner.  
 
While Marks and Gravano operated beyond the constraints of a legitimate policing 
organization, Herbert did not. However, this study also reiterates the finding of Lauchs et al; that 
success in the network does not rely on remaining within the police force. Rather Herbert only 
needed to place himself between the police and those who needed protection.  
 
While this research has uncovered some similarities between the criminal career of Herbert 
and those studied by Morselli, the differences between the studies highlights the importance of 
context when studying criminal careers. Contextual differences can open up different 
opportunities for success in criminal networks and thus, inevitably impact upon the approaches 
taken by entrepreneurs operating within them.  
 
The findings of this study have important implications for law enforcement strategies for 
disrupting corrupt networks. In particular, anti-corruption agencies should extend their gaze 
beyond uniformed officers to those they socialize with and/or used to serve with, who can broker 
arrangements with illegal operators. In addition, those who search for successful criminal brokers 
should look for opportunities for monopolies and uncover the people who control those 
monopolies, both within and without government agencies. While these represent preliminary 
outcomes, it is too early to use the specific findings of this study to inform crime prevention 
efforts.  
 
Although this research represents a first step towards developing theories to explain the 
criminal careers of corrupt police officers, it is merely one example of corruption within a 
legitimate policing agency. Further studies are required to build a sufficient knowledge base for 
identifying whether there are patterns within the network arrangements and/or career paths of 
organized criminals that can inform crime prevention. Future research should focus on the 
criminal careers of police and non-police in varying contexts to enable law enforcement to refine 
and adapt strategies for disrupting such criminal networks.    
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Conclusion 
This paper has extended the pioneering research of Morselli into the study of individual career 
paths of successful criminals by reviewing the career of Jack Herbert, who operated two 
successful police corruption networks in Queensland, Australia for over two decades. The paper 
studied Herbert’s career by mapping the social networks of the first and second Jokes – 
corruption networks between providers of illegal gambling and prostitution in Queensland and 
the QLB, which had the exclusive power to investigate these illegal activities. Morselli’s 
findings that reputation, trust and brokerage are keys to success in illicit networks were used as 
platforms for understanding how Herbert progressed through his career.  
 
Similarly to Marks and Gravano, Herbert succeeded by establishing a reputation for 
being a skilled and trustworthy operator of a corruption network, positioning himself as the 
broker of payments, and setting the boundaries of his network on who he could trust to 
participate in the corrupt activities. However, Herbert’s career was also different. 
 
Gravano succeeded by exploiting the patronage relationships in the American mafia to 
reach a point of power from which he could reduce his network constraint. Conversely, Marks 
succeeded by establishing himself as a reliable partner in drug operations. This paper has shown 
a new alternative, with Herbert’s success being based on reputation in the first Joke but the 
exploitation of his monopoly on communication with the Police Commissioner in the second 
Joke. These differences indicate that anti-corruption agencies should extend their gaze beyond 
just uniformed officers to those they socialize with and/or used to serve with who can broker 
arrangements with illegal operators and furthermore, that opportunities for monopolies should be 
examined and those who control the monopolies, both within and without government agencies, 
should be the subject of scrutiny. However, it is too early to use the findings of this study to 
inform crime prevention efforts. Although it builds on previous work, this article is the first of its 
type to address the career path of a corrupt police officer. Further research is required to enable 
patterns in the network arrangements and/or career paths of organized criminals to be identified. 
In particular, career path analysis should lead to a theory of identifying potential leader 
characteristics which in turn will assist in network disruption by law enforcement.  
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